| 知觉经验是否有表征内容 |
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| 引用本文： | 王华平.知觉经验是否有表征内容[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2011(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 王华平 |
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| 作者单位： | 山东大学哲学系,山东济南250100;厦门大学知识论与认知科学研究中心,福建厦门361005 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金项目“当代心灵哲学中的析取论研究”(10CZX031); 山东大学自主创新基金和浙江省教育厅人文社科项目Y200806013的资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 心灵哲学与认识论中的一个重要问题是知觉经验是否有内容.多数当代哲学家认为知觉经验是表征,因而是有内容的,称之为内容观.特拉维斯和布鲁尔等人则认为,内容观与朴素实在论是不相容的,朴素实在论支持的是关系观,即知觉经验是认知者与心灵独立的事物或性质之间的关系.通过对特拉维斯和布鲁尔论证过程的分析,可以发现,内容观与关系观并不冲突,并且,一个认识论上适切的内容观应该吸收部分关系观的见解.—个更为强健的观点是:知觉经验具有某种呈现模式下的罗素式命题内容.
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| 关 键 词： | 知觉经验 心灵哲学 内容观 关系观 |
Does Perceptual Experience Have Content |
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| WANG Hua-ping.Does Perceptual Experience Have Content[J].Journal of Xiamen University(A Quarterly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences),2011(6). |
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| Authors: | WANG Hua-ping |
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| Institution: | WANG Hua-ping1,2(1.Department of Philosophy,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,Shandong,2.Center for Research on Epistemology and Cognition,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,Fujian) |
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| Abstract: | Whether perceptual experience has content or not is an important issue in the research on mentalist philosophy and epistemology.Most contemporary philosophers assert that perceptual experience is a form of representation and therefore has content.This view is called the Content View and has been challenged by philosophers such as Charles Travis and Bill Brewer who argue that the Content View is not compatible with Na?ve Realism which favors the Relational View that perceptual experience is the relation betw... |
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| Keywords: | perceptual experience mentalist philosophy the Content View the Relational View |
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