公司控股股东与少数股东之间利益冲突机制分析

公司股权分散的代理成本产生于经理人和所有股东之间;在以股权相对集中或高度集中为主要特征的公司,控股股东掠夺少数股东的现象是非常严重的。尤其在没有法律或其他相关机制约束的情况下,控股股东对少数股东的侵害必然发生,控股股东会采取有损少数股东利益的各种形式来使自己的私利最大化。本文运用公司所有权结构理论、非合作博弈论和效用函数具体分析了控股股东和少数股东间的利益冲突。

System Analysis of Interests Conflict Between Controlling Shareholders and Minority Stock Holders

Agent cost of share decentralization comes from managers and all shareholders; however, in companies with comparative centralization or high centralization of shareholders, it is a serious phenomenon that controlling shareholders seriously harm the interests of minority stockholders. Without the control of laws or relevant systems, it is inevitable that the controlling shareholders will maximize their private benefit in every possible way. Through theory of company ownership structure, game theory of non-cooperation and efficiency constant, the article analyzes the system of benefit conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders.