后契约机会主义与企业治理效率研究

劳动契约具有不同于产品契约的独特性质。为解答劳动契约关系中的"敲竹杠"(hold-up)问题,我们构建的后契约机会主义模型。分析表明,对事后机会主义行为的调控选择,是成本效益原则下的均衡结果;通过非均衡蛛网模型的演化分析发现,在对机会主义行为调节参数选取适当的条件下,可使企业内部治理系统很快从不稳定状态过渡到稳定状态,这表明相比于事件治理模式,能够对经营者机会主义行为进行调控的相机治理更符合实际,更有效率。

Research on Post-contractual Opportunistic Behavior and Efficiency of Corporate Governance

Labor contracts are of unique feature different from product contracts.In order to study the "hold-up" issue in labor contracts,the model of post-contractual opportunistic behavior is constructed,which shows that it is optimal decision-making to appropriate control over the opportunism based on cost-effect principle.Further,according to the evolutionary analysis of disequilibrium by Cobweb Model,the internal control system can rapidly arrive at a stable equilibrium from disequilibrium under the condition of appropriately selecting the regulation parameters?over opportunistic behaviors.This indicates that compared with event governance,contingent governance which can adjust and control the opportunistic behaviors is more practical and more efficient.