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奖惩机制下电子类产品制造商回收再制造决策模型
引用本文:王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下电子类产品制造商回收再制造决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(5):57-63.
作者姓名:王文宾  达庆利
作者单位:东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏南京211189
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目
摘    要:研究了电子类产品制造商回收再制造决策问题。为引导制造商回收再制造,设计了一个奖惩机制。建立了制造商回收再制造的三个决策模型并分别比较了三种情形下制造商的决策结果。研究表明:只有回收再制造具有成本优势时制造商才自愿回收废旧产品;当回收再制造废旧产品具有成本优势时,该奖惩机制导致回收率提高、新产品销售价格降低、新产品需求量增加;当回收再制造废旧产品不具有成本优势时,该奖惩机制导致回收率提高、新产品销售价格提高、新产品需求量减少;针对有无回收再制造成本优势情形,分别给出了奖惩机制下制造商利润大于无奖惩机制情形下制造商利润的奖惩力度和最低回收率的临界值;本文结论能够为政府引导制造商回收再制造提供理论指导。

关 键 词:逆向物流  奖惩机制  回收  再制造  
收稿时间:2008-3-3
修稿时间:2008-9-25

The Decision-Making Model of the Electronic Product Manufacturer about Collection and Remanufacturing based on Premium and Penalty Mechanism
WANG Wen-bin,DA Qing-li.The Decision-Making Model of the Electronic Product Manufacturer about Collection and Remanufacturing based on Premium and Penalty Mechanism[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2008,16(5):57-63.
Authors:WANG Wen-bin  DA Qing-li
Institution:School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
Abstract:This paper studies the decision-making problem about the collection and remanufacturing of electronic product manufacturers A premium and penalty mechanism is designed to drive the manufacturer to collection and remanufacturing.Three decision-making models are established and the results of these models are compared.Several conclusions are shown.The manufacturer is willing to collect and remanufacture waste products only when he has the advantage of cost.Collection rate increases,new product price decreases...
Keywords:reverse logistics  premium and penalty mechanism  collection  remanufacturing  
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