中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究

中央环境规制政策最终由地方政府监督、企业履行落实，意在使污染企业减少污染排放和技术创新。以“十一五”节能减排综合性工作方案为自然实验，以清洁企业为对照组、污染企业为实验组，从地方政企策略行为的视角，理论与实证分析中央环境规制政策通过减污效应和创新效应对污染企业全要素生产率的影响。研究表明：（1）中央环境规制使地方政府更有激励给予清洁企业以政府补贴和融资便利，而污染企业会采取减少产出、迁移、产品转换、退出市场等威胁性策略，迫使地方政府为其提供政府补贴和融资便利，以进行技术创新和污染治理。（2）与清洁企业相比，污染企业一方面因治污成本增加，导致全要素生产率下降，而另一方面因融资贷款用于研发创新生产更多新产品，提高了全要素生产率，最终使中央环境规制对污染企业全要素生产率的影响不显著。（3）异质性检验发现，中央环境规制仅提升了国有污染企业的全要素生产率，但降低了中部地区污染企业的全要素生产率。

Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China

Central environmental regulation policies, supervised by local governments and implemented by enterprises, are intended to enable polluting enterprises to reduce emissions and innovate. This study takes the “11th Five-Year Plan” for energy-saving and emissions-reduction as a natural experiment, with clean enterprises as the control group and polluters as the experimental group, to theoretically analyze and empirically test the impact of central environmental regulation policies on total factor productivity of polluting enterprises through pollution reduction effect and innovation effect from the perspective of strategic behaviors of local governments and enterprises. Results are as follows. (1) Central environmental regulation motivates local governments to provide government subsidies and financing facilities to clean enterprises. Polluting enterprises will adopt threatening strategies such as output reduction, relocation, product conversion and withdrawal from the market, forcing local governments to provide government subsidies and financing facilities for technological innovation and pollution control. (2) Compared with clean enterprises, on the one hand, the total factor productivity of polluting enterprises decreases due to the increase of pollution control costs, and on the other hand, the total factor productivity is improved due to the financing loans used for R&D and innovation to produce more new products. Finally, the impact of central environmental regulation on the total factor productivity of polluting enterprises is not significant. (3) Heterogeneity test shows that central environmental regulation only improves the total factor productivity of state-owned polluting enterprises, but reduces the total factor productivity of polluting enterprises in central China.