建筑市场注册执业人员激励机制与监管博弈分析

建筑市场注册执业人员执业信用缺失影响经济资源的合理配置，危害市场经济秩序。本文通过构建政府监管部门与注册执业人员之间的静态博弈，引入经济惩罚与社会福利两变量，解释了在建筑产业快速发展时期不良行为频发而治理效果不佳的原因。引入奖励机制考察执业人员之间的动态博弈，证明了如果政府的奖励措施是长期行为并且能够为执业人员带来适当的收益，将会形成注册执业人员群体主动选择诚信的进化稳定策略。因此政府应该在充分考虑社会福利的基础上，充分利用信号传递机制与信用激励机制，通过奖励与惩罚措施，构建长期的有效的建筑市场注册执业人员信用监管模式。

Game Analysis on Incentive Mechanism and Supervision of Practicing Qualification Personnel in Construction Market

The Professional misconduct supervision of practicing qualification personnel in construction market is a sort of prominent problem in current field of engineering construction. The paper constructs the static game between government regulators and practicing qualification personnel, and concludes that the probability of integrity is related to penalties of the government while the latter gives sufficient consideration to social benefits maximization. Under incentive mechanism, it is proved that professional misconduct of practicing qualification personnel, to some extent, can be managed in case that the government＇s incentives are long lasting. If additional incomes of practicing qualification personnel, given by government incentives, reach a certain amount, the group of practicing qualification personnel will actively choose integrity to form evolutionarily stable strategy. Hence, our government is suggested to build a long-term effective credit regulatory model of practicing qualification personnel in construction market on the basis of fully considering to social benefits, making full use of signal transmission and credit incentive mechanism, reward and punishment measures.