生产能力限制下价格Stackelberg博弈模型

生产能力限制条件下,同质产品市场中两企业以价格为决策变量进行Stackelberg竞争,采取有效配给规则。两企业对称情况下,生产能力较小时模型存在唯一的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,两企业销量达到自身生产能力,得到相同收益;生产能力较大时,追随企业匹配领头企业的价格,博弈存在后动优势。分析了领头企业生产能力大于追随企业的不对称情形,并给出相应均衡。算例分析表明,企业价格竞争的前提是充分大的供给能力,追随企业应在领头企业生产能力较大时进入市场。

Price Stackelberg Competition and Capacity Constraints

Two identical firms compete with price as the strategic variable in a homogeneous product duopoly game.The firms are limited by capacity constraints,and an efficient rationing rule is adopted.We show that when the firms are symmetric and have a small capacity,there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,in which they both sell up to their capacity and get the same payoff.In another certain capacity range,the follower will adopt the same price with the leader,and there is a second mover advantage.We analyze an asymmetric case and attain the equilibrium.The example analysis indicates that price competition is based on the large enough capacity,and the follower should enter the market when the leader has a relatively larger capacity.