No-envy and Arrow's conditions |
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Authors: | Vincenzo Denicolò |
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Institution: | (1) Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, I-40125 Bologna, Italy (e-mail: denicolo@economia.unibo.it), IT |
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Abstract: | This paper analyzes the concept of envy-freeness in the framework of Arrovian social choice theory. We define various no-envy
conditions and study their relationships with Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives. We also propose
a new condition, called Minimal Equity, that says that each individual must have the conditional power to veto at least one
social state (for instance, a social state which is particularly unfair to him). We show that, under unrestricted domain,
Pareto Optimality and a weak independence condition, Minimal Equity leads to an impossibility result.
Received: 9 October 1997/Accepted: 27 May 1998 |
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Keywords: | |
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