| 试析美国国会制约美国政府对外军售的机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 游朋轩.试析美国国会制约美国政府对外军售的机制[J].燕山大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2007,8(3):59-62. |
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| 作者姓名： | 游朋轩 |
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| 作者单位： | 贵州大学,马列部,贵州,贵阳,550000 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于民意机构的特殊身份,美国国会是美国对外军售的真正控制者。美国法律规定了国会制约行政部门对外军售的机制。美国国会制约行政部门对外军售机制包括"要求申报"、"联合反对"、"牵制总统"和"其他立法手段"四个环节。作为军售的真正控制者,美国国会实际上并不是对外军售的反对者,相反却常常是美国对外军售的推动者。
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| 关 键 词： | 美国国会 军售 制约 机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-2692(2007)03-0059-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年3月20日 |
Analysis on the Institutions of Congress' Constraint to Arms Sales of the United States |
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| YOU Peng-xuan.Analysis on the Institutions of Congress' Constraint to Arms Sales of the United States[J].Journal of Yanshan University:Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition,2007,8(3):59-62. |
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| Authors: | YOU Peng-xuan |
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| Abstract: | Based on the specific identity of public opinion,Congress is the actual controller of the United States foreign arms sales.It's capability to influence the executive branches proceeding arms sales comes from the legal institutions.This paper has analyzed the four aspects of the institutions: notification requirements,joint disapproval,constraining the President,and other legislations.This paper argues that Congress' role in the United States foreign arms sales policymaking and the inter-relationship between Congress and the executive branches must be deeply studied when examining the evolution of the United States foreign arms sales policy. |
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| Keywords: | Congress arms sales constraint institutions |
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