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战略阻绝效应对战略联盟决策的影响分析
引用本文:宋铁波,张亮星,吴小节. 战略阻绝效应对战略联盟决策的影响分析[J]. 管理工程学报, 2008, 22(1): 11-15
作者姓名:宋铁波  张亮星  吴小节
作者单位:华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东,广州,510641
摘    要:本文将对战略联盟决策的分析纳入SCP范式,并通过构造在位者和潜在进入者之间的三阶段博弈模型来分析战略阻绝效应对战略联盟决策的影响.本文认为:在位者的合适的战略联盟行为具有战略阻绝效应,可以通过改变潜在进入者的进入预期、影响进入者的行为并促进在位者的支付,这种支付的改变将拓宽战略联盟的决策空间,在位者将在更高的联盟成本或更低的固定边际成本下降程度上建立战略联盟.

关 键 词:战略联盟  联盟决策  战略阻绝效应
文章编号:1004-6062(2008)01-0011-05
修稿时间:2005-06-20

The Analyses of Strategic Deterrence Effect's Impact on Strategic Alliance Decision-making
SONG Tie-bo,ZHANG Liang-xing,WU Xiao-jie. The Analyses of Strategic Deterrence Effect's Impact on Strategic Alliance Decision-making[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2008, 22(1): 11-15
Authors:SONG Tie-bo  ZHANG Liang-xing  WU Xiao-jie
Abstract:This paper brings the analysis of strategic alliance into SCP paradigm and analyses strategic deterrence effect's impact on strategic alliance decision-making through constructing a three stages game model between incumbents and potential entrants.This paper indicates that incumbents' right strategic alliance behavior has strategic deterrence effect and can change potential entrants' entry prospect that will affect entrant's behavior and increase incumbents' performance.The change of performance will extend strategic alliance's decision-making space,so incumbents will set up strategic alliance in higher alliance cost or lower fix marginal cost decline.
Keywords:strategic alliance  alliance decision-making  strategic deterrence effect
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