A formal theory approach to lawsuits and corporate deviant behavior: building a more efficient system |
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| Affiliation: | 1. College of Information and Electrical Engineering, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, PR China;2. Key Laboratory of Agricultural Machinery Monitoring and Big Data Applications, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Beijing 100083, PR China;3. School of Geography, Geology and the Environment, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK;4. College of Land Science and Technology, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100193, PR China;5. Shaanxi Provincial Meteorological Bureau, Xi’an 710014, PR China;1. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina/UFSC, Florianópolis, SC 88056-000, Brazil;2. Department of Sustainable Systems Engineering (INATECH), University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany;3. Department of Ocean Operations and Civil Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Alesund, Norway |
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| Abstract: | This paper discusses the problems in the efficient implementation of tort reform. Current, and many proposed reforms, fail to provide a Pareto optimal solution. The problems with current policies lie in the fact that they only alter the incentive structures of one actor in the tort system. A truly efficient system needs to alter incentive structures for both potential litigants and potential defendants. Using economic modeling, the paper argues that efficient tort reform can be achieved by utilizing decoupled tax incentives. |
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