| 基于博弈分析的国有资本进退机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 孟庆春,王涛.基于博弈分析的国有资本进退机制研究[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2007(5):92-97. |
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| 作者姓名： | 孟庆春 王涛 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 山东大学,管理学院,山东,济南,250100
2. 山东大学,社科处,山东,济南,250100 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对当前争议较大的国有资本的进退问题,设计了国有企业和私有企业(包括外国企业)开展市场竞争的博弈模型,然后通过最优性分析给出了国民经济中国有经济最优比重应该满足的条件,进一步地通过比较静态分析阐明了国有资本进退的一般机制,最后对这一分析框架及其所获结论进行了简要总结。
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| 关 键 词： | 国有资本 进退机制 博弈模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-9839(2007)05-0092-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年2月1日 |
A Gaming Theory-Based Study of the Mechanism of the Investment and Withdrawal of State-owned Capital |
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| MENG Qing-chun,WANG Tao.A Gaming Theory-Based Study of the Mechanism of the Investment and Withdrawal of State-owned Capital[J].Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences),2007(5):92-97. |
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| Authors: | MENG Qing-chun WANG Tao |
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| Abstract: | Firstly,a game model was designed to help both state-and private-owned enterprises sharpen their competitive edge in order that the major controversial question whether state-owned capital should be invested or withdrawn can be answered.Then,the conditions for the optimal proportion of state-owned capital were discussed through an optimality analysis.And finally,the general mechanism for the investment or withdrawal of state-owned capital was discussed through the static analysis,and a framework and the results were summarized. |
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| Keywords: | state-owned capital mechanism for investment and withdrawal game model |
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