会计盈余信息选拔的不可能定理及其理论深化

在美国等较为成熟的股票市场中,会计盈余信息的主要功能是定价,但是在政府管制较为严格的中国股票市场中,会计盈余信息的首要功能是"选拔".文章对中国证监会和上市公司之间的博弈构建了数学模型,提出了"会计盈余信息选拔的不可能定理":若以下两个条件存在--(1)监管部门设定选拔标准有一个上限,或(2)上市公司通过合法或非法方式虚报盈余的"虚报成本系数"较小,那么单纯依靠会计盈余信息将无法选拔出理想的目标公司.由此得到的可能的理论深化是:度量标准应当与契约形式相配合,如果制度环境本身限制了会计盈余信息作为度量标准的使用,那么改善的要点不应该集中于会计盈余信息本身,而应该在于调整博弈制度的安排.同时也为中国新会计准则执行研究提供了新的理论视角.

Impossible theorem of selection by earnings information and theoretic deepening

In developed stock markets such as American market,the major usage of accounting information is pricing.But the primary function of accounting information is to do selection in the Chinese stock market by strict regulation.In this paper,we modeled the game between the Chinese Securities Regulation Commission(CSRC) and listed companies,where the CSRC chose candidates by ROE during SEO.We got the impossible theorem of selection according to accounting information of earnings: if(1) there was a ceiling of the ...