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Uncovered set choice rules
Authors:Michele Lombardi
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London, Mile End Road, London, E1 4NS, England
Abstract:I study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a total asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the choice set coincides with the uncovered set of T restricted to that feasible set. This notion of ‘maximization’ offers testable restrictions on observable choice behavior.
Keywords:
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