Communication in Cournot competition: An experimental study |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimerstrasse 20, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany;2. Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Olshausenstrasse 40, 24118 Kiel, Germany;3. Kiel Institute of World Economics, Duesternbroker Weg, 24105 Kiel, Germany;4. Department of Economics, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Pulau Pinang, Malaysia;1. Department of Banking and Finance, University of Mannheim, Germany;2. Behavioural and Quantitative Finance, Barclays, London, UK;3. Betterment.com, New York, NY, United States;4. Saïd Business School, Oxford, UK;1. Comparative Psychology, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany;2. Chair of Marketing, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany;3. Department for Corporate Management and Economics, Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany;1. Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180, USA;2. School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK;3. Universite Paris 1 Pantheon - Sorbonne, Centre d''Économie de la Sorbonne, Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 Boulevard de l''Ĥopital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France;4. Economics Department, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187, USA;1. Department of Economics, Bocconi University, Italy;2. Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Italy;3. Department of Economics, University of Verona, Italy |
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| Abstract: | This study investigates the impact of communication on outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a ‘standardized-communication’ and a ‘free-communication’ device. Using both students and managers as subjects, we find that managers behave in a similar way under both communication devices, while students collude slightly better under free than under standardized communication. Second, while under standardized communication managers select lower outputs than students, we observe no difference in subject pools under free communication. Finally, we observe more collusion in duopoly than in triopoly. |
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| Keywords: | Economic experiment Cournot oligopoly Subject-pool effects Managers Communication Cheap talk |
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