On games under expected utility with rank dependent probabilities |
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Authors: | Klaus Ritzberger |
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Affiliation: | (1) Dept. of Economics, Institute for Advanced Studies, Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna, Austria |
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Abstract: | Expected utility with rank dependent probabilities is a generalization of expected utility. If such preference representations are used for the payoffs in the mixed extension of a finite game, Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. Set-valued solutions, however, do exist even for those more general utility functions. But some set-valued solutions may have certain conceptual shortcomings. The paper thus proposes a new set-valued solution concept, called fixed sets under the best reply correspondence. All set-valued solution concepts are robust to perturbations of the expected utility hypothesis. |
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Keywords: | Non-expected utility non-cooperative normal-form games setvalued solutions |
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