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PARTIES,POLITICS, AND REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM CLEAN AIR ACT ENFORCEMENT
Authors:Robert Innes  Arnab Mitra
Institution:1. 1‐209‐228‐48721‐209‐228‐4007;2. Professor, Department of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts, UC Merced, Merced, CA 95343
Abstract:Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility‐level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989–2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election. (JEL D73, Q52, Q53)
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