产权制度、管理层权力与内部控制

文章以沪深A股市场2009-2012年上市公司作为研究样本,从不同产权制度视角研究管理层权力与内部控制有效性之间的关系.研究发现,管理层权力与内部控制的关系受到产权性质的影响.其中,在中国地方国有上市公司中,管理层权力与内部控制质量正相关;而中央政府控制的国有上市公司中,管理层权力对内部控制并无显著影响.这说明,由于地方分权及地方政府之间激烈的“政治锦标赛”,一方面促使地方政府将更多剩余控制权让渡给管理层,另一方面有利于激发管理层的“企业家精神”,有利于企业内部控制制度建设.研究同时发现,对于家族控股直接上市的民营企业,由于创业者与管理者身份的合一及最终控制人的企业家本质属性,管理层权力与内部控制质量正相关;而对于以兼并重组方式上市的民营企业,管理层权力对内部控制质量并无显著影响.

Property rights,managerial power and internal control

This paper studies the relationship between management power and internal control effectiveness from the perspective of ownership system using the data of Chinese firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A Stock market from 2009 to 2012. We find that management power is positively significantly related to internal control effectiveness for local state-owned firms. For central state-owned-firms, there is no strong correlation. This means that the fierce political competition between local governments results in that state governments give more residual control rights to management and this also motivates the entrepreneurship of management, which is good for the construction of enterprise internal control. We also find that management power and internal control quality has positive correlation for family firms. That is because the manager is also entrepreneur and the ultimate controller has the essential attributes of the entrepreneur. However, we fail to find close relationship between management power and internal control quality private enterprises listing by merging and restructuring.