考虑公平关切及其谈判破裂点的供应链运作

将考虑谈判破裂点的Nash解作为公平参考点,构建了基于Stackelberg博弈的公平关切供应链模型,分别在批发价契约和回购契约中探讨了供应链的决策和协调问题,分析了谈判破裂点对公平关切供应链的影响.研究发现:当批发价分别为外生、内生变量时,谈判破裂点对最优订货量的影响是完全相反的.此外,在批发价契约和回购契约中,基于Stackelberg博弈的公平关切供应链均无法协调,继而文章采用价格补贴的方式进行联合契约设计使供应链达到协调.

Supply chain operations considering fairness concerns with bargaining disa-greement point

This paper builds a supply chain model with fairness-concerns based on Stackelberg game by intro-ducing Nash bargaining solution with disagreement points as fair reference points.It discusses how disagree-ment points influence the coordination of supply chains in both the wholesale-price contract and the buy-back contract.In addition, it shows that when the wholesale price is exogenous and endogenous, the influences of disagreement points on the optimal order quantity are contrary.Finally, it is found that the supply chain can-not achieve coordination in both contracts at equilibria and that it can be coordinated if the markdown-money policies are used.