政府干预、国有集团结构动态演化与配置效率

以2004年~2013年国有系族企业集团控制的上市公司为样本,首次对国有集团内部结构的形成动因及其动态演变过程进行大样本的实证研究,发现,1)我国国有集团的治理结构安排是政府选择的结果:当新进入国有集团的企业历史业绩较好、政府放权意愿更强时,其更可能被安置于集团金字塔结构且受到的掏空行为显著减少;2)被安置于金字塔结构的企业,在进入集团后的长期业绩表现显著差于进入之前;3)集团内部的成员上市公司绩效越差,更可能被剥离出国有集团,这种可能性在层级越高的企业更加明显.这些结果表明了我国国企改革的逻辑不一致性,即国企改革的初衷在于放权,而政府在培育和发展国有集团的过程中却存在着过多的行政干预行为,从而弱化了国企改革的效率.文章为当前国企分类改革背景下集团的战略重组和结构优化调整提供了一定的启示,也丰富了集团治理的研究文献.

Government intervention,the dynamic structure of state-owned business groups,and efficiency of asset allocation in China

This paper examines the formation and dynamic evolution of the structure of Chinese state-owned business groups, according to the state-owned business groups ( SOBGs) between 2004 and 2013 in China. First, it is found that the formation of the structure of state-owned business groups is the result of government selective behavior.The SOBGs grow vertically ( as pyramids) when the ultimate controller acquires new firms with good past performance and the government has strong willingness to delegate the power.Moreover, the tunneling of newest firms arranged under the pyramids is also lower significantly.Second, to our surprise, those new firms arranged under the pyramids perform worse after their entrance into the business group.Final-ly, firms with bad performance are more likely to be excluded from the business group, especially firms ranked high in the pyramids.Our findings show the inconsistent logic of the reform of state-owned enterprises in Chi-na.That is, the decentralization has been a chief theme of China' s enterprise and market reforms, however, there are lots of government intervention in the development of SOBGs, which attenuates the efficiency of the SOE reform.Our paper provides some valuable implications for the strategic restructuring and the structural improvement of SOBGs, and enriches the literature of business groups.