Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences |
| |
Authors: | Klaus Nehring |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA 95616, USA (e-mail: kdnehring@ucdavis.edu), US |
| |
Abstract: | We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness
property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite’s (1977) theorem to correspondences. The result is interpreted as a possibility
theorem on the dominant-strategy implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely
ignorant about the finally selected outcome. Alternatively, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions
entailed by Nash implementability of correspondences.
Received: 3 November 1997/Accepted: 26 April 1999 |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|