"假象"背后的均衡及信息的代价研究

通过库诺特模型可以说明,“假象”的存在将改变均衡结果:如果信息获取是无成本的,那么“假象”将使信息占优一方的均衡利润增加,其对手的均衡利润可能减少,也可能增加;如果获取对手的信息是有代价的,根据我们给出的信息投资的边界条件,当获取信息的代价大于这一边界条件时,获取对手信息是有必要的,反之,应该放弃对信息的投资。

Equilibrium under Misleading Appearance and the Cost of Information

This paper proves that the equilibrium for the Cournot game model will change as the "misleading appearance" is introduced. If there is no cost in obtaining information, the one with advantageous information will have an increased equilibrium return, and the other may have an increased or decreased return. On the other hand, if there is cost in obtaining information, a boundary condition is derived. It is necessary to invest if the cost of obtaining the opponents information does not surpass the boundary condition. Otherwise, information investment should be given up.