The effect of framing on the choice of co-payment policies, reducing moral hazard and post-choice-evaluation

This study analyses the impact of two financially equivalent frames of a co-payment policy on the choice between a co-payment policy and one with full cost recovery. It also examines the incentive effect of the co-payment and the post-choice evaluation on the pay-offs in case of unexpected losses, using the example of health insurance. Two experimental studies form the context for an empirical investigation of the theoretical considerations. We examine the framing-related effects of a rebate compared to a premium reduction frame of a co-payment policy. The results confirm that a rebate frame has a positive effect on the intention to choose a co-payment policy. The intention to avoid claims in the premium reduction frame is greater than in the rebate frame. In case of unexpected losses because of high insurance claims, the rebate frame results in less dissatisfaction and causes fewer regret effects. The results support the theoretical considerations that insurance companies should account for these differences and design their co-payment policies according their priorities, either with a rebate or a premium reduction frame.