Toward an understanding of the endogenous nature of group identification in games |
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Authors: | John Smith Katerina Bezrukova |
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Affiliation: | 1. Economics Department, Rutgers University-Camden, Camden, NJ 08102, USA;2. Psychology Department, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA 95053, USA |
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Abstract: | It is commonly assumed that identification with a social group is constant throughout the play of a one-shot game in the absence of feedback. Our experiment provides evidence that challenges this assumption. Subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma game. These versions are distinguished by the relative attractiveness of the uncooperative action. The version with a relatively attractive uncooperative action is referred to as the Easy Game and the other as the Difficult Game. Subjects who play the Difficult Game, exhibit a change in group identification which is related to their selected action. No such relationship exists within the Easy Game. Additionally, the change primarily occurs after the action is selected rather than upon inspection of the game. |
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Keywords: | Group identification Experimental game theory Endogenous preferences Social identity Decision difficulty |
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