金融监管:委托-代理的伦理问题

金融监管是一国政府当局为了社会公共利益、纠正金融市场失灵所作的一种制度安排。本文依托委托-代理理论的分析框架,分析研究了制约金融监管效率的金融伦理问题,指出金融监管的目的在于实现金融体系中伦理公平和市场效率的均衡。在委托-代理关系中的激励相容和参与约束限制条件下,金融监管的效率受到了来自被监管者和监管者自身伦理障碍的双重制约,从根本上而言,有效金融监管有赖于金融伦理的建设和维护,有赖于"个人伦理完整性"的实现。

Financial Supervision: Ethic Problems in the Entrusted Agency

Financial supervision is a sort of institution-setting, aiming to rectify the failures of financial market in the interest of the public. By terms of the framework of the trusted agency theory, this thesis studies the problems about financial ethics which restrain the efficiency on financial supervision, illustrating the purpose of which is to achieve the equilibrium between equality and efficiency in the financial system. And the efficiency of financial supervision is restricted by the double obstacles on the ethics of the supervisors and the supervised. In the final analysis, the efficient financial supervision depends on the realization of "personal ethic integrity" as well as the construction of financial ethics in society.