基于博弈的“外包内做”型制造外包违规控制研究

在管理实践中发现,"外包内做"型外包模式已经成为了制造企业的重要生产方式之一,但生产质量问题却日渐突出。本文研究了"外包内做"型制造企业外包中承包方的违规行为控制问题。运用博弈分析方法,分三种情形:违规与罚款、罚款前提下违规与巡检、奖励与罚款前提下违规与巡检,分析了制造企业与劳务承包方关于制造质量的博弈,为解决制造企业生产阶段外包业务的质量控制问题提供了一种新的思路。研究结果表明:(1)除了以往研究者已证明的对违规罚款外,对履约奖励也一样可以有效地减少违规行为,但两者都有一定的适用条件,两者共同运用时,只要V-(1-a)(R+F+I)<0,承包方就会选择履约;(2)巡检仅能减少承包方的违规收益,但并不能改变承包方的违规行为,因此对控制违规意义不大;(3)提高违规被发现的概率,对减少劳务承包方的违规行为具有重要作用。根据研究结果,企业可采取罚款与奖励并用、提高违规被发现的概率、降低违规收益等方法达到对施工质量进行控制的目的。本文的研究将对采取"外包内做"型制造企业的质量管理提供一定的理论基础和实践指导。

A Study on Violation Behavior Control of “Making in Own Factory by Others” Type Manufacturing Outsourcing Based on Game

The "Making in Own Factory by Others" type manufacturing outsourcing has become one of the important modes of manufacturers in practice. However, the problem of production quality is increasingly serious. In this paper, the controlling question of the violation behavior in manufacturing outsourcing is studied. The game method is used in this study. More deeply, three kinds of game models are discussed: violation and penalty, violation and inspect with penalty, violation and inspect with both penalty and bonus. This provides a new way of thinking for manufacturer who outsourcing its production to others to solving the quality control matter.The results of the study indicate that: (1) In addition to the effectiveness effect of penalty to violation in reducing the violation actions which has been proven by other researchers, we find that reward to the contractor who complies with the rules also can effectively reduce the violation behavior. Of course, both penalty and reward must be applied in certain conditions. If V-(1-a)(R+F+I)<0, then the contractor will select comply with rules, when both reward and penalty are used together. (2) Inspect can reduce the violation benefit of the contractor, but it can not reduce the possibility of violation behavior. So inspect is no notable effect on reducing violation behavior. (3) It has great effect on reduce the violation behavior if the outsourcer can raise the probability to find the violation behavior. According to the study results, the outsourcer can use three methods to control the manufacture quality: to use penalty and bonus together, or raise the probability to find the violation behavior, or reduce the violation benefit. Theoretical basis and practical guidance can be provided to the manufacture quality management of the enterprise who adopts "Making in Own Factory by Others" Type Manufacturing Outsourcing.