复杂装备主制造商-供应商主从合作激励协调Stackelberg模型

当前,飞机等复杂装备的研制越来越多的采用主制造商-供应商合作模式。由于复杂装备研制过程的不确定和复杂性,供应商的努力程度在很大程度上决定了产品的研制水平。针对复杂装备研制过程中主制造商与供应商之间的动态交互行为,基于供应商的努力程度,建立了主制造商为主方、供应商为从方的Stackelberg主从合作激励协调博弈模型,研究主制造商最优激励策略设计和供应商最优努力策略选择问题,并进行应用分析。研究结果表明,主制造商通过设计控制最优激励大小,进行利益冲突协调可实现主制造商利益最大化而供应商利益不受损的协调目的,并进一步诱导供应商的最优努力水平。

The Stackelberg Model of Optimal Incentive Cooperation between Main Manufacturer and Suppliers of Complex Equipments

Nowadays, a new organizational model called "Main manufacturer-Suppliers" model is widely applied in the R&D procedure of complex equipments such as the plane. Due to the uncertainty and complicity in the R&D, the effort of the suppliers has an important effect on the R&D level of the complex equipments. Based on the Game theory, the effort of suppliers was set as a key factor and established the Stackelberg model, in which the main manufacturer acting as a leader and the suppliers as the followers, to analyze the best incentive strategies of main manufacturer and the best effort strategies of suppliers. And the applying of the model set up in the paper was analized. The results show that the main manufacturer can increase its benefit without damaging the interests of suppliers by controlling the incentive policy. This study will provide a valuable guidance for manufacturer to coordinate the efficiency issues ahout the coorpetation of suppliers.