大股东的支撑行为与隧道行为——基于托普软件的案例研究

本文结合托普软件案例分析了我国上市公司大股东实施支撑行为(propping)和隧道行为(tunneling)的动机及实施途径,并对相关的治理机制进行了讨论。我们发现,支撑行为与隧道行为是大股东为获得自身利益最大化而采取的方向不同的利益转移行为,支撑行为的目的在于提高上市公司的业绩指标,而隧道行为的目标是实际资源向大股东转移,通常不影响当期业绩,但对公司价值和小股东利益造成长期损害。充分发挥外部治理机制作用,加强投资者权益保护的法制建设是制约大股东行为的有效途径。

Big Shareholders' Propping and Tunneling:a Study Based on the Case of TopSoft Company

With the help of the case of the TopSoft Company,we have analyzed in this paper both the motivation and implement approaches of propping and tunneling actualized by main shareholders of China's listed companies,and have discussed the relevant governance mechanism.We have found that both propping and tunneling are main shareholders' behavior of transferring benefits in different directions in order to maximize their own benefits,that propping aims at raisin the performance targets of listed companies,and that tunneling,which usually does not have an effect on the current performance but which causes a long-term harm to company's value and minority shareholders' interests,aims to transfer actual resources to main shareholders.Efficient approaches to restricting the behavior of main shareholders are to completely give free rein to the setup of control by the external,and to reinforce the legal construction to protect investors' right and interests.