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带保修期的寿命型产品多属性招标采购机制设计——以大型医疗设备为例
引用本文:马本江,徐笔武,徐晨. 带保修期的寿命型产品多属性招标采购机制设计——以大型医疗设备为例[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(4): 112-120
作者姓名:马本江  徐笔武  徐晨
作者单位:中南大学商学院, 湖南 长沙 410083
基金项目:国家自然科学基金委创新群体资助项目,国家自然科学基金面上资助项目,国家自然科学基金青年资助项目,湖南省人文社会科学基金,中南大学人文社科杰出青年人才基金
摘    要:产品的期望寿命是重要的质量属性之一,事前不可观察且不可验证,直接对该质量属性进行投标没有意义。针对此问题,以大型寿命型医疗设备招标采购为例,利用拍卖机制设计理论建立了一类具有信号传递功能的多属性招标采购模型。模型确定了最优投标规则,包括设备最优期望寿命投标、最优保修期投标与最优价格支付。模型确立了甄别投标企业技术类型与传递产品质量可靠性信息的机制。研究结果表明:首先该机制满足参与约束与激励相容约束,投标企业分别按自身期望利润最大化进行投标;其次该最优机制能保证企业承诺的保修期与期望寿命正相关,能保证技术类型最高、所提供产品期望寿命最大(保修期最长)的企业中标,并且中标企业创造相对来说最高的社会福利。构造一个算例说明新的多属性招标采购机制在实践中易于操作,是可实施的。当质量指标存在不可观察和不可验证的维度时,相关研究为解决多属性招标采购问题提供了一个新思路。

关 键 词:保修期  多属性  招标采购  信号传递  机制设计  
收稿时间:2011-05-18
修稿时间:2012-12-03

Multi-attribute Bidding Mechanism Design for Warranted Lifetime Products:A case study on Large Medical Equipments
MA Ben-jiang,XU Bi-wu,XU Chen. Multi-attribute Bidding Mechanism Design for Warranted Lifetime Products:A case study on Large Medical Equipments[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2013, 21(4): 112-120
Authors:MA Ben-jiang  XU Bi-wu  XU Chen
Affiliation:School of Business,Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
Abstract:For the life expectancy of single major medical equipment cannot be observed or verified and it is one of the key quality indicators,it has no meaning to directly bid for this quality attribute. To this problem, warranty is introduced into bidding mechanism of hospital procurement as an important decision variable, and a new multi-attribute bidding model with signal transduction function is established based on the auction mechanism design theory. The optimal bidding rules, including best bid for equipment life expectancy,best bid for equipment warranty, and the best price to pay is defined in the model. A mechanism that could identify enterprises' technology types and transmit information about product quality reliability is also established. The results show that: firstly, this mechanism satisfied participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint.In other words, bidding enterprises can bid for the maximal profits separately according to their own expectations;Secondly, this optimal mechanism ensures a positive correlation between life expectancy and warranty that enterprises committed. It also ensures enterprises, which are the highest technical types and provide maximum product life expectancy (warranty period the longest), win the bidding. It also ensure the successful company create a relatively highest social welfare. A example is used to illustrate the new mechanism which is enforceable and easy to operate. A new idea when the quality dimension can not be observed and verified is provided by the research.
Keywords:warranty  multi-attributes  bidding  signal transmission  mechanism design
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