Bid-rigging networks and state-corporate crime in the construction industry |
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| Affiliation: | 1. National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Department of Law, New House, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland;2. Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and Transcrime, Largo Agostino Gemelli 1, 20123 Milano, Italy;3. Cardiff University, School of Social Sciences, Glamorgan Building, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff, CF10 3WT, United Kingdom;1. California State University, Long Beach, 1250 Bellflower Blvd, LongBeach, CA, 90840, USA;2. Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada;3. University of Gent, St. Pietersnieuwstraat 33, 9000 Gent, Belgium;4. University of Amsterdam, PO Box 1030, 1012 CP, the Netherlands;1. University of Illinois at Chicago, Loyola University Medical Center, Uptake Technologies, Inc., United States;2. School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore;1. TBS Business School, Campus Barcelona, C/ Trafalgar, 10, 08010, Barcelona, Spain;2. University of Salento, Dipartimento di Scienze Dell’Economia “A. De Viti De Marco”, Piazza Tancredi, N7, 73100, Lecce, Italy;3. EAE Business School, Campus Barcelona, C/Tarragona, 110, 08015, Barcelona, Spain;4. University of Barcelona, Facultat D’Economia I Empresa, Av. Diagonal, 690, 08034, Barcelona, Spain;5. Universidad Ramón Llull, IQS School of Management, Via Augusta, 390, 08017, Barcelona, Spain;1. Department of Economics, Columbia University, United States;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, United Kingdom;3. Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea |
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| Abstract: | This study highlights the symbiotic relationship that may arise between political and business actors in conspiracies organized around public construction bids. Based on a core-periphery social network analysis, the study tracks the emergence of such a conspiracy in the city of Laval (Canada) by illustrating the evolution of bid-rigging networks revolving around suspected and persistent acts of corruption, bid-rigging, and bribery. To assess this process, the study monitors irregular bidding indicators across a data set compiled from more than 7000 public construction tenders that were processed by the city from 1966 to 2013. Findings reveal that firms suspected of bid-rigging activities were perennial core participants largely as a result of a state-corporate crime system that served as the guiding force for agreements between the main construction entrepreneurs. |
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| Keywords: | Bid-rigging networks State-corporate crime Corruption Construction industry Core-periphery analysis |
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