政府刺激性投资政策下中小微企业银税互动设计及其投融资决策

银税互动是中国解决中小微企业融资问题的金融创新。文章在政府刺激投资政策(财政补贴和税收减免)下研究银税互动设计与中小微企业投融资问题，采用实物期权方法，并运用资产定价理论和动态规划理论解析地得到了企业各未定权益价值以及企业决策结果。通过静态比较分析，文章发现与税收减免政策相比较，财政补贴的企业投资加速，破产风险较低，企业价值较高，对应银行紧缩的信贷政策。在债务融资结构方面，企业一般选择银税互动融资。但是，对于财政补贴政策而言，在较稳定的金融环境下，企业会选择银税互动和民间借贷混合的融资方式。此外，文章从企业基本面角度发现，对于波动率较低的企业，银行应采取宽松的信贷政策；对于波动率较高的企业，银行应采取紧缩的信贷政策。最后，从企业和政府角度均发现，在政府政策中财政补贴可能占优。

The Design of Bank-Tax Interaction and Investment and Financing Decisions for SMEs under the Government’s Policies of Stimulating Investment

Bank-tax interaction (BTI, henceforth) is a financial innovation to solve the financing of Small- and Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, henceforth) in China. In recent years, BTI is popular, and then, according to statistics, China’s banking financial institutions had issued 1.609 million loans to trustworthy SMEs, totaling 1.57 trillion yuan via BTI by the end of September 2019. Specially, after the COVID-19 epidemic, the State Administration of Taxation, together with the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, issued a notice that banking financial institutions should make good use of BTI to help SMEs resume production, thereby promote stable economic development. Besides, government also adopts investment subsidy and tax reduction to support SMEs’ development. In order to explore the impact of BTI on SMEs’ investment and financing polices under investment subsidy and tax reduction, respectively, the real-options approach is utilized to study these problems.