| 电商平台信息披露策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 余航,田林,陈云. 电商平台信息披露策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(5): 192-203. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0355 |
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| 作者姓名： | 余航 田林 陈云 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.暨南大学经济学院,广东 广州510632; 2.广东顺德农村商业银行股份有限公司博士后科研工作站,广东 佛山528300; 3.复旦大学管理学院,上海200433; 4.上海财经大学上海市金融信息技术研究重点实验室,上海200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71922008;72091211);国家社会科学基金资助项目(21CGL019) |
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| 摘 要： | 电商平台模式下,供应商决定产品价格将产品直接出售给消费者,并与平台企业共享收益。通常,消费者与产品供应商/平台企业在产品属性(匹配)信息上存在不对称性。本文基于博弈理论,研究电商平台(如：亚马逊、京东等)的产品信息披露策略,比较两种信息披露方式：“平台披露”与“供应商披露”。首先考虑由一个平台企业和一个供应商组成的垄断结构。研究表明,信息披露策略取决于产品属性(匹配)的相对重要性。同时,与平台披露相比,供应商更愿意披露全部产品信息。然后考虑一个平台企业和两个供应商组成的竞争结构。研究发现,与垄断结构不同,平台披露下,平台总是披露全部产品信息;而供应商披露下,信息披露策略取决于产品属性(匹配)信息的相对价值。此外,平台会偏好由供应商负责信息披露。
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| 关 键 词： | 电商平台 信息披露 属性(匹配)信息 竞争, |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-03-16 |
| 修稿时间： | 2019-10-31 |
Information Disclosure Strategies in the E-Commerce Platform |
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| YU Hang,TIAN Lin,CHEN Yun. Information Disclosure Strategies in the E-Commerce Platform[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(5): 192-203. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0355 |
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| Authors: | YU Hang TIAN Lin CHEN Yun |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China; 2. Post-Doctoral Research Center, Guangdong Shunde Rural Commercial Bank Company Limited, Foshan 528300, China; 3. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China; 4. Shanghai University of Fiuance and Economics Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology, Shanghai 200433, China |
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| Abstract: | In the e-commerce platform mode, the supplier determines the product price, sells the product directly to consumers and shares the revenue with the platform. Usually, there exists information asymmetry in product (matching) attributes between consumers and product suppliers/platforms. In reality, a consumer is not certain about whether his private taste matches a product unless firms provide some information, and he will make an expectation about his matchness for that product if no information is provided. To resolve consumers’ fit uncertainty, a seller faces two complicated issues: how to offer product information for consumers and how much?What makes this issue more complicated is that even platforms can directly disclose product information. |
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| Keywords: | e-commerce platform information disclosure attribute (matching) information competition, |
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