IPO信息披露与监管的演化博弈分析

注册制下，信息披露是IPO的核心。本文构建以发行人、保荐人和监管者为主体的三方演化博弈模型，研究IPO信息披露过程中参与人的策略选择及其博弈均衡。结果表明：监管者强力监管所获得的激励、保荐人敷衍塞责所受到的惩罚和发行人虚假披露所受到的损失显著地影响博弈均衡；如果监管者强力监管所获得的激励足够充分，或者发行人虚假披露与保荐人失责所受到的惩罚足够严厉，那么发行人将会选择真实披露信息；此外，媒体曝光概率也显著地影响博弈均衡。因此，要提高IPO信息披露质量，就必须设计充分而有效的激励与惩罚机制。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of IPO Information Disclosure and Regulation

Under registration system, information disclosure is the core of IPO. Full and timely information disclosure is the core of IPO valuation. A three-party evolutionary game model is constructed including issuer, sponsor and regulator, the strategy selection and game equilibrium of each participant in the IPO information disclosure process is studied, and a simulation analysis is conducted. The results show that if the incentives for regulators are sufficient or the penalties for issuers and sponsors are severe enough, issuers will choose to disclose the information truthfully. Media exposure significantly affects the game equilibrium and can improve the quality of IPO information disclosure. Therefore, establishing sufficient and effective reward and punishment mechanism is the fundamental policy to improve the quality of IPO information disclosure. In short, IPO information disclosure quality is jointly determined by issuers, sponsors and regulators, and is significantly affected by media exposure probability. As long as an effective and sufficient incentive and punishment mechanism is established, the problem of IPO false information disclosure that has long plagued the development of China's capital market can be solved. In the short term, strengthening the supervision of issuers is the most direct measure to improve the quality of IPO information disclosure. However, in the long run, the solution is to build up effective and adequate reward and punishment mechanisms by pooling the efforts of regulators, social supervision forces represented by the media, investors and judicial institutions.