政府补贴下考虑零售商不同竞争行为的闭环供应链决策及合同选择

本文考虑了由一个制造商和两个竞争零售商构成的闭环供应链，其中制造商是供应链Stackelberg博弈的领导者，两个零售商作为博弈的跟随者，研究政府再制造补贴下供应链的决策及合同选择问题。以集中决策为基准，分别建立零售商内部采用古诺双寡头博弈和Stackelberg博弈时的决策模型，分析了零售商的不同竞争行为、竞争强度及政府补贴对最优结果的影响，同时对零售商采用古诺双寡头博弈时成员间签订成本分担契约及收益共享契约后闭环供应链的决策及利润进行了对比，并设计出可以协调整个供应链的新契约。结果表明零售商之间的竞争行为会使其最优零售价格增大，最优废旧产品回收率及供应链最大利润降低，当零售商内部采用Stackelberg博弈时闭环供应链所获得的利润最低；竞争越激烈，三种模型下各成员的最优定价、回收率及利润都越低；政府补贴可以有效激励集中决策下的回收行为及促进该模式下供应链利润的增长；当零售商采用古诺双寡头博弈时，成本分担契约的签订可以提高闭环供应链的最优回收率，而收益共享契约能够使得供应链及制造商的最大利润有明显增长。

Decisions and Contract Selection of Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Different Competitive Behaviors of Retailers under Government Subsidy

The increasing global pollution and consuming resources promote industry and academia to pay attention to closed-loop supply chain. Adding recycling and remanufacturing to the traditional supply chain can effectively reduce resource consumption, so the development of closed-loop supply chain is guided by governments through subsidies.In view of the gap in previous studies, the decisions and contract selection of a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers under government subsidy are considered. The manufacturer acts as the leader of Stackelberg game in the supply chain and two retailers act as followers.Based on centralized decision-making, two decision models under different competitive behaviors of retailers are established, including Cournot duopoly game and Stackelberg game. According to different game sequences, and the equilibrium results of each model are obtained by reverse solution.Then the effects of competition behaviors, competition intensity and government subsidy on the optimal decisions and maximum profits are analyzed. Finally, the role of cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract in the decisions of supply chain members is discussed when retailers adopt the Cournot duopoly game. Since a single contract cannot perfectly coordinate the supply chain, these two contracts are combined and improved to design a new contract that can achieve supply chain coordination.