On the role of the hostage in ultimatum bargaining games |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Ball State University, USA;2. Department of Economics, United States Naval Academy, 589 McNair Road 10-D, Annapolis, MD 21402, USA;3. United States Naval Academy, USA;1. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada 3 i Escola Politècnica Superior d’Enginyeria de Manresa, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya., Spain;2. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA, 92110-2492, USA;1. Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA;2. Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1020, USA;1. Washington University in St. Louis, United States;2. MIT, United States;1. Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany;2. University of Johannesburg, Faculty of Economics and Financial Sciences, South Africa;1. Lehrstuhl für Nichtlineare Analysis und Modellierung, Fakultät für Mathematik, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Campus Essen, Thea-Leymann Str. 9, 45127 Essen, Germany;2. Department of Mathematics, University “A.I. Cuza” of Iaşi, 700506 Iaşi, Romania;3. Head of Lehrstuhl für Nichtlineare Analysis und Modellierung, Fakultät für Mathematik, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Campus Essen, Thea-Leymann Str. 9, 45127 Essen, Germany |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper examines behavior in a three-player ultimatum game. The payoff to the non-decision-making player (the “hostage”) is separate from the bargaining pie and varies. We find that while responders may behave altruistically towards the hostage, they are more likely to reject a given offer if it leaves them with a more inequitable payoff relative to the hostage. Offers appear to be unaffected by the presence of a hostage. Though not a direct test of the Fehr and Schmidt Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M., 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3), 817–868] and Bolton and Ockenfels Bolton, G., Ockenfels, A., 2000. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review 90, 166–193] models, our results are qualitatively consistent with their predictions. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
