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基于公司治理指数的经理层激励机制分析
引用本文:刘晓磊,马召勇.基于公司治理指数的经理层激励机制分析[J].北京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2008,8(4):33-37.
作者姓名:刘晓磊  马召勇
作者单位:1. 河北经贸大学,金融学院,石家庄,050061
2. 河北经贸大学,工商管理学院,石家庄,050061
摘    要:针对我国上市公司激励约束机制的发展明显滞后于经理层治理的发展问题,利用历史方法,分析了现有激励约束机制——年薪制、持股制和利润分享制的作用,构建了改进的激励约束性报酬函数。

关 键 词:经理层治理  评价指数  激励约束机制  报酬函数

Analysis of the Top Managers' Incentive Mechanism Based on the CCGINK
LIU Xiao-lei,MA Zhao-yong.Analysis of the Top Managers'' Incentive Mechanism Based on the CCGINK[J].Journal of Beijing Polytechnic University(Social Sciences Edition),2008,8(4):33-37.
Authors:LIU Xiao-lei  MA Zhao-yong
Institution:LIU Xiao-lei~1 MA Zhao-yong~2(1.Coilege of Finance,Hebei University of Economics , Business,Shijiazhnang 050061,China,2.College of Business , Management,Shijiazhuang 050061,China)
Abstract:The quality of incentive and restrictive mechanism guarantees the top managers' governance,however,the CCGINK(China Companies Governance Index)indicates that the incentive and restrictive mechanism is incompatible with the development of the top managers' governance.With the methods of the historical analysis,this paper analyses the present incentive and restrictive mechanism--yearly salary,stock holding and profit sharing system,and establishes a modified incentive and restrictive compensation function.
Keywords:top managers\' governance  evaluation index  incentive and restrictive mechanism  compensation function  
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