| 知识交易 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 金祥荣,朱希伟. 知识交易[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2001, 31(5): 125-133 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 金祥荣 朱希伟 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 浙江大学经济系浙江杭州 310028 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 知识交易过程存在着交易双方信息不对称的现象,卖方向买方披露信息消除这一信息不对称,会引发买方的"搭便车”行为.一方面,买方的"搭便车”行为受自身因素制约;另一方面,卖方通过销售制度的设计,可以减少买方的"搭便车”行为;买卖双方相互博弈的结果,导致了知识产品价格的上涨.
|
| 关 键 词： | 知识 " 搭便车”行为 比较静态分析, |
| 文章编号： | 1008-942(2001)05-0125-09 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001-01-30 |
Knowledge Transaction |
| |
| JIN Xiang-rong,ZHU Xi-wei. Knowledge Transaction[J]. Journal of Zhejiang University(Humanities and Social Sciences), 2001, 31(5): 125-133 |
| |
| Authors: | JIN Xiang-rong ZHU Xi-wei |
| |
| Abstract: | An asymmetry of information exists between bargaining parties in knowledge transaction. Sellers may reveal relevant infor-mation to buyers, which will eliminate the asymmetry but induce free riding. While buyers' behavior is subjected to its own factors, sellers can reduce free riding through designation of distribution systems. All the interactions will result in a continuous price increase for knowledge goods. |
| |
| Keywords: | knowledge," free riding" ,comparative static studies |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》下载免费的PDF全文 |
|
