Public information and social choice |
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Authors: | Hans Gersbach |
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Institution: | Alfred-Weber-Institut, Universit?t Heidelberg, Grabengasse 14, D-69117 Heidelberg, Germany (e-mail: gersbach@wp.awi.uni-heidelberg.de), DE
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Abstract: | We examine the value of public information when a society uses a social choice rule to decide among a set of outcomes. We
require that a social choice function satisfies unrestricted domain, non-decisiveness and the Pareto principle. We show that
there exist payoff structures for every social choice function, such that an arbitrary subset of voters is worse off by public
information. We apply the proposition to collective information acquisition and to irreversible investments.
Received: 2 June 1997/Accepted: 30 September 1998 |
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Keywords: | |
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