Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published? |
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Authors: | Hans Gersbach Volker Hahn |
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Institution: | (1) CER-ETH, Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, ZUE D7, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland;(2) CER-ETH, Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, ZUE D13, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland |
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Abstract: | We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of central-bank council members is socially beneficial
when the public is unsure about the efficiency of central bankers and central bankers are angling for re-appointment. We show
that publication is initially harmful since it creates a conflict between socially desirable and individually optimal behavior
for somewhat less efficient central bankers. However, after re-appointment, losses will be lower when voting records are published
since the government can distinguish highly efficient from less efficient central bankers more easily and can make central
bankers individually accountable. In our model, the negative effects of voting transparency dominate, and expected overall
losses are always larger when voting records are published. |
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