预售众筹产品质量夸大行为及其预防措施分析

运用理论模型分析了预售众筹中创业者夸大产品质量的行为及其预防措施.首先,构建了预售众筹发起阶段与销售阶段的理论决策模型;其次,求解模型得到了创业者的最优众筹价格及向投资者承诺的产品质量,分析了创业者夸大产品质量的动机;再次,在此基础上设计了由保证金与信用约束组成的预防措施,分析了预防措施对创业者夸大产品质量行为的预防效果.研究结果表明:在无预防措施情形下,创业者会向投资者夸大产品质量以获得众筹成功与追求收益最大化;众筹平台收取保证金虽能对创业者夸大产品质量行为起到预防作用,但预防效果有限;增加信用约束能弥补保证金措施的缺点,提高预防措施的预防效果.最后,通过数值算例进一步阐述了理论模型所得到的相关结论.

The exaggeration of product quality and its precautions in the preorder crowdfunding

This paper analyzes entrepreneurs'' exaggerating of product quality and the related precautions by using theoretical models. Theoretical models for the initiation stage and selling stage of the pre-order crowdfunding are constructed. By solving the optimization problem of entrepreneurs,the optimal crowdfunding price and product quality promised to investors are given,and the incentives for entrep,reneurs to exaggerate the product quality are analyzed. On this basis,this paper designs precautions consisting of margins and credit constraints,and analyzes their preventive effects on entrepreneurs'' exaggerating product quality. The results show that: Entrepreneurs exaggerate the product quality in order to make crowdfunding successful and maximize theirreturns without precautions. Crowdfunding platforms'' collecting margins can prevent entrepreneurs from exaggerating product quality,but with limited preventive effect; Adopting credit constraints can make up for the shortcomings of margins and improve the preventive effects. Finally,a numerical analysis elaborates the relevant results obtained by the theoretical model.