融资融券对上市公司治理影响的研究

以融资融券机制推出为背景, 运用我国内地A股市场上市公司为样本, 研究了融资融券对上市公司治理水平的影响.回归结果显示, 成为融资融券标的后, 上市公司高管离职与高管薪酬对于公司绩效的黏性均有提高, 表明融资融券可以作为外部公司治理机制.机制检验显示融资融券是通过促进公司信息释放而提升公司治理水平的.进一步分析显示, 当公司面临行业竞争压力较小或面临财务约束时, 融资融券对于公司治理的促进作用更加明显.最后, 将融资和融券分开分析, 发现融资机制和融券机制均对公司治理有提升作用.证明了融资融券机制可以提高资本市场对企业的监督, 促进企业信息释放, 从而提高上市公司治理水平.

Impacts of margin trading and short selling on Chinese listed firms' corporate governance

This paper examines the impacts of the pilot program of margin trading and short selling on corporate governance using the data of listed firms in China. The results show that the firms significantly increase executive pay for performance sensitivity and CEO turnover for performance sensitivity after their stocks become pilot stocks. These results suggest that margin trading and short selling can serve as external governance devices. We further confirm that becoming pilot stocks improves corporate governance through reducing information asymmetry. We also find that the positive impacts of margin trading and short selling on corporate governance are stronger for firms that are in less competitive product markets and have larger financial distress. In addition, we investigate the impacts of margin trading and short selling separately and find that both margin trading mechanism and short selling mechanism improve corporate governance. These results imply that margin trading and short selling can enhance monitoring stemming from capital market, facilitate information transparency, and thus improve corporate governance.