新能源汽车补贴政策与保有量影响研究:单位补贴、销售奖励与产品差异化

以提升新能源汽车市场保有量和整体质量的补贴政策为背景，建立包括政府、制造商、零售商和消费者在内的动态博弈模型，将产业数量目标、高质量发展目标及补贴预算约束等政策特征纳入模型，对单位补贴、销售奖励以及差异化单位补贴政策的影响进行理论研究发现：在确保政府补贴绩效为正的条件下，政府对制造商和消费者的单位补贴可增加新能源汽车的 市场需求量，并提高制造商和零售商的利润水平；叠加的销售奖励不仅可改善单位补贴的市场结果，还可提高政府补贴绩效.考虑汽车质量的差异化单位补贴在不降低市场需求总量的同时，可减少低质量车的需求量并增加高质量车的需求量.单位补贴的最优值主要由政府设定的数量目标和制造商单位成本决定，数量目标和单位成本越高，则单位补贴越高，但政府补贴绩效越低.

Adoption of new energy vehicles under subsidy policies: Unit subsidies, sales incentives and product differentiation

Based on the subsidy policies to increase the adoption of new energy vehicles and upgrade the overall industry, dynamic game models involving the government, manufacturers, retailers and consumers are established to analyze the impacts of policies involving unit subsidies, sales incentives and differentiated unit subsidies. Three specific policy characteristics are introduced into our models, including both quantity target and high-quality development of the industry and subsidy budget constraints. The results show that given the positive subsidy performance, unit subsidies to manufacturers and consumers can increase the market demand for new energy vehicles and the profit of manufacturers and retailers. Aditional sales incentives can improve the market outcome of unit subsidies and increase the performance of government subsidies. The differentiated unit subsidies can reduce the demand for low-quality vehicles and increase the demand for high-quality vehicles without reducing the total quantity demanded, thereby promoting the upgrading of the industry. The optimal value of unit subsidy is mainly determined by the quantity target set by the government and the unit cost of the manufacturer. The higher the quantity target and unit cost, the higher the unit subsidy, but the lower the government subsidy performance.