| 腐败的经济解释--基于张二江案例的分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 范桂汕.腐败的经济解释--基于张二江案例的分析[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2003,2(Z1):18-24. |
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| 作者姓名： | 范桂汕 |
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| 作者单位： | 华南农业大学,经济贸易学院,广东,广州,510642 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文从信息不对称理论和委托--代理理论出发,应用博弈论剖析张二江的案例,探讨其走向腐败的经济道理.文章指出,政治市场严重的信息不对称造成了腐败的收益(π)和监督的成本(C)很高,而对腐败的惩罚(F)却偏小.因此,根治腐败的根本在于改善政治市场的信息不对称状况和加大惩治腐败的力度.
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| 关 键 词： | 腐败 经济解释 博弈论 案例 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-0202(2003)S0-0018-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年7月6日 |
An Economic Explanation of Corruption--Based on the Analysis of the Case of Zhang Er-jiang |
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| FAN Gui-shan.An Economic Explanation of Corruption--Based on the Analysis of the Case of Zhang Er-jiang[J].Journal of South China Agricultural University:Social Science Edition,2003,2(Z1):18-24. |
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| Authors: | FAN Gui-shan |
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| Abstract: | Based on asymmetric information theory and principal - agent theory, this paper analyzes the economic reasons through the game theory. The author hclds that the asymmetric information has made the revenue of corruption and the cost of supervising high, but the punishment of corruption quite light in political market. So the root measures of anti - corruption lie in improving the situation of asymmetric information in the political market and to strengthen the puaishment on corruption. |
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| Keywords: | corruption economic explanation game theory case |
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