业务外包委托代理模型中的风险补偿安排

外包活动中代理成本的高低直接影响到外包企业的核心竞争力,如何降低业务外包中的代理成本是本文的研究重点。本文首先从代理成本的机理分析入手,考虑到风险补偿在针对"代理问题"的激励契约设计中的重要性,对一个经典的最优激励契约模型进行改进,期望改进的模型能够有效降低代理成本。改进后的模型结果表明:在最优激励契约中加入风险补偿因素可以使得风险成本和激励成本下降,从而降低代理成本。本文的研究结果具有一定的普遍意义,适用于各种类型的业务外包活动,对外包企业最优激励契约的设计具有指导意义。

An Analysis of Principal-agent Relationship of Outsourcing Incentive Contract on the Risk Compensative

How to reduce the agent cost,which directly influnces the core competitive edge of businesses engaged in outsourcing operations,is the essential concern of this paper.This paper analyzes the mechanism of the agent cost first,considering the importance of the risk compensation in the incentive contract which aimed at the Principal-agent question,then ameliorates a classical incentive contract model,in order to reduce the agent cost.The results prove: it can reduce the agent cost and the incentive cost throug...