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现代企业组织制度中的委托─代理关系
引用本文:李必强,刘运哲.现代企业组织制度中的委托─代理关系[J].中国管理科学,1999,7(2):57-61.
作者姓名:李必强  刘运哲
作者单位:武汉汽车工业大学管理学院 430070
摘    要:现代企业组织制度中存在一系列委托─代理关系,基于所有权和经营权相分离的委托─代理制既是必要的,有效的,又存在着委托人和代理人的效用函数不同的矛盾。西方管理学家对委托人目标和代理人效用函数的不一致性进行了研究,提出了委托─代理理论。本文简要介绍这一理论,并从对代理人的考核评价和奖惩、实行目标管理、培育企业文化以及建设正常运行的市场四个方面,论述了建立健全激励─约束机制,改善委托─代理关系的途径。

关 键 词:现代企业组织制度  委托  代理关系  效用函数  代理成本  约束成本  目标管理  企业  文化  
收稿时间:1998-10-26;

The Principal-Agent Relations in Organization Institution of Modern Enterprises
Li Biqiang,Liu Yunzhe.The Principal-Agent Relations in Organization Institution of Modern Enterprises[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,1999,7(2):57-61.
Authors:Li Biqiang  Liu Yunzhe
Institution:School of Management, Wuhan Automotive Univevsity, Wuhan 430070
Abstract:There are a selles of principal-agent relations in organization institution of modern enterprises. The principal-agent mechanism based on separating of proprietary rights and management rights is not only necessary and effective, but also there is contradictory of difference between utility of functions of principal and agent. West management scientists have researched on the difference between utlility functions of principal and agent. They suggested theory of principal-agent. This paper gives a brief introduction to the theroy, and discusses the construction of healthy encouragement-constraint mechanism and the ways to improve principal-agent relations through assessing and rewarding/punishing to agent, imPlementing objective management, cultivating enterprise culture, and constructing normal running market.
Keywords:organization institution of modern enterprises  principal-agent relations  utility function  agent cost  constraint cost  objective management  enterprise culture  
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