欧盟《稳定与增长公约》框架下财政约束的必要性——基于货币主义的价格决定理论的分析

基于货币主义的价格决定理论,为欧盟财政约束规则背后的"核心假设"寻求理论支持。在解释"货币联盟成员国的过度财政赤字究竟会如何引发货币联盟发生通货膨胀"的基础上,并论证欧洲中央银行并不具备完全独立性和民主责任性,在欧洲经济与货币联盟中设置财政约束规则,要实现欧元区物价稳定和欧元汇率稳定的双重目的。

Necessity of Fiscal Restraint under the Framework of Stability and Growth Pact in European Union——From the Perspective of the Monetarist Price Determination Theory

This paper attempts to provide the theoretical support to the "core hypothesis" which can be regarded as the basis of the fiscal rules in the European Economic and Monetary Union.Based on the explanation of how the excessive fiscal deficit in the single member state causes the inflation in the whole monetary union,this paper points out that the monetization of credit mechanism should depend on the precondition that the central bank is dependent and not responsible.Since the European Central Bank has no complete independence and responsibility,it is important to establish the fiscal discipline in the European Economic and Monetary Union.