终极控制人性质、连锁董事关系与审计独立性

以中国深市和沪市2006—2009年2 992家上市公司为样本,检验了终极控制人性质和连锁董事关系对审计独立性的影响。通过回归分析发现,当上市公司的终极控制人是政府,且由"四大"会计师事务所审计时,连锁董事关系的存在能促使其支付更高的审计费用,而且对于异常审计费用为正的子样本,上市公司终极控制人的国有性质、连锁董事关系对非标意见的签发概率没有显著影响;对于异常审计费用为负的子样本,国有控制公司更容易收到非标审计意见。研究表明,政府控制、连锁董事关系能增强审计师的独立性。

Ultimate Ownership,Interlocking Directorship and Audit Independence

This paper investigated the impact of ultimate ownership and interlocking directorship on audit independence.Taking 2 992 Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2009 as the sample,it was found that among clients of Big 4 auditors,the interaction of ultimate state ownership and interlocking directorship has a positive impact on abnormal audit fees.But in the sub-sample of positive abnormal audit fees,no significant relation was found between ultimate ownership,interlocking directorship and the propensity to issue qualified opinions.And in the sub-sample of negative abnormal audit fees,government-controlled companies are more likely to receive qualified opinions.These results indicate that government control and the presence of interlocking directors can enhance audit independence.