When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus |
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Authors: | Wilko Letterie Otto H Swank Hendrik P van Dalen |
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Institution: | (1) Maastricht University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, MW-ORG, P.O. Box 616, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands (e-mail: w.letterie@mw.unimaas.nl), NL;(2) Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute, OCFFB, PO Box 1738, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands (e-mail: swank@few.eur.nl; dalen@wrr.nl), NL |
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Abstract: | In this paper advisors are selected by two ministers with conflicting interests in order to (1) acquire information, and
(2) obtain political legitimacy concerning a project. In the end, parliament decides whether or not the project, of which
the consequences are uncertain, is implemented. In principle a minister wants to appoint an advisor whose preferences are
similar. However, since the advisor needs to convince the decisive player in the model, the minister may appoint an advisor
whose preferences are closer to those of the agents to be persuaded. We also show when polarised advice occurs (the advisors
have different preferences) and when consensual advice occurs (they have the same preferences).
Received: 29 June 1998/Accepted: 26 May 1999 |
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