句子指称的模型事实论

弗雷格主张句子的指称是真值,罗素主张句子的指称是事实,维特根斯坦认为句子的指称是事态,Barwise和J.Perry主张句子的指称是情境类型,陈晓平主张句子的指称是事件。但这些观点都面临较大困难,故本文提出句子指称的模型事实论(model-fact theory)。模型事实论主张:只有相对于一个模型才可以严格地谈句子的指称;如果一个句子在某个模型上有指称,则该句子的指称是该模型上的事实。对词也有类似的主张,即只有相对于一个模型才可以严格地谈词的指称;如果一个词在某个模型上有指称,则该词的指称是该模型中的对象。本文对此作了论证。并用这一观点解决了否定存在难题,且解决的方法不同于蒯因和A.P.Martinich。

Model-fact Theory of the Reference of a Sentence

Frege said the reference of a sentence was truth value.Russell put it as fact.Wittgenstein regarded it as state of affairs.Barwise and J.Perr considered it as situation genre.Chen Xiaoping took it as incident.These ideas are problematic.Therefore,this paper puts forward the model-fact theory of the reference of a sentence.The model-fact theory says,we cannot talk significantly about the reference of a sentence without relating it to a model,and if the sentence has its reference on the model,the reference is a fact in the facts-set of the model.The model-fact theory also maintains that,we cannott talk significantly about the reference of a word without relating it to a model,and if the word has its reference in the model,the reference of the word is an object in the objects-set of the model.By this theory we give a new solution to the riddle of nonbeing.The solution is sharply different from that of Quine or A.P.Martinich.