首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

基于国有企业经营者视角的激励机制解释
引用本文:王再文,应宏峰.基于国有企业经营者视角的激励机制解释[J].太原理工大学学报(社会科学版),2005,23(3):67-69.
作者姓名:王再文  应宏峰
作者单位:西北大学,经济管理学院,陕西,西安,710069
摘    要:一方面,由我国市场发育的特点决定,国有企业经营者承担的职能更加复杂,对企业的生存发展也更为重要;另一方面,由多层委托-代理关系决定,国有企业的代理成本过高,国有企业经营者对企业所有者利益损害的可能性较大。尽快建立、完善对企业经营者的激励机制是国有企业及其所有者的现实选择。科学的经营者激励机制应体现两个特征:(1)按劳取酬;(2)有效竞争。

关 键 词:国有企业  经营者职能  多层委代关系  激励机制
文章编号:1009-5837(2005)03-0067-03
修稿时间:2005年4月29日

An Explanation of Incentive Mechanism from the View of the State-owned Enterprise Managers
WANG Zai-wen,YING Hong-feng.An Explanation of Incentive Mechanism from the View of the State-owned Enterprise Managers[J].Journal of Taiyuan University of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2005,23(3):67-69.
Authors:WANG Zai-wen  YING Hong-feng
Abstract:On one hand,by the characters of Chinese market development the function of stated-owned enterprise operators becomes more complicated,and important to enterprise existence.On the other hand,based on multilevel trust-agent and expensive agent cost,the interest of enterprise owner is possibly impaired.So,it is realistic choice of the stated-owned enterprises and them owner that to establish and improve excitation mechanism.Two characters of reasonable excitation mechanism for enterprise operators is distribution according to work and effective competition.
Keywords:state-owned enteuprise  function of enterprise operator  multilevel trust-agent  excitation mechanism
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号